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Who are the rule-takers and rule-makers in the African BIT universe? Using computational 
measures of textual similarity this paper provides a nuanced empirical answer to this 
question. First, we find that African states tend to be rule-takers in North-South relations, 
yet enjoy greater agency in negotiations of South-South BITs. Only few African countries, 
however, use their greater say in intra-African negotiations to include public policy 
exceptions in BITs. Indeed, recent North-South BITs contain more policy space than their 
Southern counterparts in Africa. Second, rule-makers and rule-takers also exist within the 
African South-South BIT landscape. Yet, in contrast to North-South relations, negotiation 
outcomes seem to be shaped more by expert knowledge than by power asymmetries. 
Powerful states like Egypt fail to dominate negotiations, while small-island-state Mauritius 
with its strategic investment policy agenda succeeds in setting the terms of investment 
agreements. This paper thus provides a more nuanced view of the African treaty landscape, 
points to new areas of research and highlights the importance of technical expertise in 
achieving coherent treaty networks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Who writes the rules in the investment treaty universe? Prior studies suggest that 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) often contain a distinctly “Northern” or developed 
country handwriting. BIT programs first originated in Europe,1 and as new countries, 
including from the developing world, jumped on the BIT bandwagon, they looked to 
European treaty practice for inspiration.2 Furthermore, empirical research has shown 
that, in general, developed countries are more successful than developing countries in 
achieving consistent treaty networks, which suggests that developed countries tend 
shape negotiation outcomes.3 
 
While it is thus well documented that, as a general matter, developed countries are the 
primary rule-makers in the universe of bilateral investment treaties, this does not 
preclude the existence of a distinctly “Southern” handwriting in parts of the BIT 
landscape. In particular, when bargaining power is more evenly distributed, as is the 
case of BITs concluded between two developed countries, we would expect that 
negotiation outcomes more clearly reflect developing countries’ policy preferences. 
Put differently, while developing countries may often be the rule-takers in North-
South BITs, they can become rule-makers in South-South agreements. In this paper, 
we use Africa, and in particular sub-Saharan Africa, as a case study to empirically 
verify this hypothesis tracing developing countries’ handwriting in BITs.4 
 
To what extent have African countries played an active role in the making and 
shaping of their bilateral investment treaties? To answer that question, we proceed in 
four stages. First, we introduce the challenges and opportunities developing countries 
face in investment treaty making generally drawing on the existing literature. We 
conclude that the main challenge for African countries is to make their voice heard in 
asymmetric North-South negotiations and that the main opportunities for shaping 
BITs lie in South-South treaties. With that framework in mind, we next introduce our 
methodology that employs computational text comparisons to reveal rule-takers and 
rule-makers in Africa. We then apply that method to compare African North-South 																																																								
* Post-doctoral Researcher in International Law, World Trade Institute, Hallerstrasse 6, Bern, CH and 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Maison de la Paix, Chemin 
Eugène-Rigot 2, Geneva, CH, wolfgang wolfgang.alschner@graduateinstitute.ch.  
** PhD Candidate in International Economics, Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies (IHEID) Maison de la Paix, Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2, Geneva, CH and European University, 
St. Petersburg, RU, dmitriy skugarevskiy@graduateinstitute.ch. We gratefully acknowledge the 
funding support from the SNF project ‘Convergence versus Divergence? Text-as-data and Network 
Analysis of International Economic Law Treaties and Tribunals’, from the SNIS project ‘Diffusion of 
International Law: A Textual Analysis of International Investment Agreements’, and from NCCR trade 
regulation. 
1 The first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. In the 1960s other European 
countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands or Switzerland followed suit. 2 Stephan W Schill, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law (Cambridge Univ Press 
2009) (emphasising the role of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Investments 
Abroad as template for subsequent BITs around the world). 3 Wolfgang Alschner and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, ‘Consistency and Legal Innovation in the BIT 
Universe’ (2015) Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 2595288 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2595288>, accessed 28 April 2015. 4 In this paper, we focus exclusively on bilateral investment treaties and do not investigate treaty 
design in other types of investment agreements such as regional investment treaties or free trade 
agreements with investment chapters. 
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agreements with African South-South agreements. We find that African countries 
indeed are less successful in shaping the terms of North-South negotiations and have a 
greater say in South-South BITs. In the past, African countries partially used their 
greater agency to integrate more public policy safeguards into their South-South 
treaties, while today most policy flexibility is imported from North-South 
Agreements. Finally, we look more specifically at who are the rule-makers and rule-
takers in South-South African agreements. We find that economic power only plays a 
subsidiary role in determining outcomes of negotiations and that expert knowledge 
and strategic investment policy is more important in shaping treaty design. 
 
 
2. Challenges and opportunities for developing countries in 
investment treaty making 
 
The literature of developing countries’ experience with international investment 
agreements emphasizes two themes that provide a background for our subsequent 
empirical analysis: (1) the struggle for policy space in asymmetric BIT negotiations 
and (2) the greater opportunity for shaping BIT design in South-South agreements. 
 
2.1. Challenges: The quest for policy space in asymmetric negotiations 
 
BITs emerged in the context of asymmetric investment relations. 5  Developed 
countries sought to protect their foreign investors abroad against political risk in 
developing host countries; while developing countries sought to attract Northern 
investment in return for promising protection in a BIT.6 The unidirectional flow of 
investments from North to South meant that although BITs were formally reciprocal, 
the sovereignty costs associated with them fell exclusively on the developing 
country.7   
 
Initially, many developing states were thus reluctant to sign on to BITs fearing that 
the treaties would unduly constrain their domestic policy space. As part of the 
discourse on the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1960s 
and 70s, they emphasized sovereign control over their natural resources and stressed 
their right to expropriate with the payment of only “adequate” (rather than “full”) 
compensation.8 From the 1980s onwards, however, developing countries’ opposition 
to investment protection began to dwindle in the face of debt crises and economic 
																																																								5 Jeswald W Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on 
Foreign Investment in Developing Countries’ (1990) 24 International Lawyer (ABA) 655, 663. 6 Jeswald W Salacuse and Nicholas P Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67, 77. 
According to them ‘a BIT between a developed and a developing country is founded on a grand 
bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect of more capital in the future.’ 7 José E Alvarez, ‘The Evolving BIT’ (2010) Transnational Dispute Management 3; FA Mann, ‘British 
Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’ (1982) 52 British Yearbook of International 
Law 241, 241; Patrick Juillard, L’évolution des sources du droit des investissements (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1994) 108. 8 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘Brief History of International Investment Agreements, A’ (2005) 12 UC 
Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 157, 166–8. 
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difficulties and they started to sign more and more BITs in order to attract foreign 
capital thereby hoping to mitigate their balance of payments difficulties.9 
 
When opting into BITs developing countries found it difficult to retain the policy 
space they had fought for during the NIEO. Developed countries long had little 
incentive to explicitly include public policy exceptions into BITs since unidirectional 
investment flows made BIT claims against Northern countries unlikely.10 Developing 
countries, in turn, were in desperate need of foreign investment willing to trade capital 
for sovereignty. The asymmetry in bilateral bargaining forced them to forego the 
policy space demands they had advocated collectively, and instead signed on to the 
more protective treaty templates of Northern countries in order to attract foreign 
investment. 11 
 
Since the late 1980s, this situation has evolved in some respects but not others. In the 
early 2000s investor-state arbitration claims began to increase giving rise to 
multimillion-dollar investment awards that highlighted the fact that BIT’s sovereignty 
costs were real.12 In particular, claims began to rise against developed countries, 
which, partly in response, began to revise their model treaties to integrate explicit 
policy space flexibilities into their BITs.13 At the same time, the benefits of BITs 
were increasingly cast into doubt as empirical studies failed to conclusively show an 
impact of these agreements on investment inflows.14 What did not change, however, 
was that developed countries still tended to dominate negotiation outcomes. The U.S.-
Rwanda BIT (2008), for instance, contains several novel policy exceptions − yet they 
were not introduced in response to Rwanda’s call for policy space, but formed part of 
the revision of the U.S. model BIT, which served as template for the negotiations of 
the U.S.-Rwanda BIT (2008). In short, from the early days onwards, North-South 
BITs carried a heavy North-South handwriting.15 																																																								9 Andrew T Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1997) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639; Kenneth J 
Vandevelde, ‘Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs’ (1993) 11 Int’l Tax & Bus. 
Law. 159. 10 The possibility of developed countries being sued pursuant to BITs seemed remote initially. See 
generally Alvarez (n 7) 3; Mann (n 7) 241. 
11 Guzman (n 9). 12 On the tension between investment arbitration and policy space see generally Gus van Harten, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford Univ Press 2007). 13 UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking (United Nations 
2007); Wolfgang Alschner, ‘The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment Treaty Design: Myth 
Versus Reality’ (forthcoming 2017) 42 Yale Journal of International Law; for the U.S., see Mark 
Kantor, ‘The New Draft Model US BIT: Noteworthy Developments’ (2004) 21 Journal of International 
Arbitration 383; Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 US Model BITs: 
Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests’ in Karl P Sauvant (ed), Yearbook on International 
Investment Law and Policy 2008-9 (2009). 14 Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’ (2007) 33 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 405; Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment-Some Hints from Alternative Evidence’ 
(2010) 51 Va. J. Int’l L. 397; UNCTAD, The Role of International Investment Agreements in 
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries (United Nations 2009); on the effect of 
BITs on investment flows, see generally Karl P Sauvant and Lisa E Sachs (eds), The Effect of Treaties 
on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment 
Flows (Oxford University Press 2009). 15 For a full empirical appraisal of this point, see Alschner & Skougarevskiy (n 3). 
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2.2. Opportunities: Agency in South-South agreements 
 
If unidirectional investment flows and asymmetric bargaining power is the reason 
why North-South treaties long tended to not to include policy space safeguards, 
South-South treaties offered an opportunity to better integrate developing country 
preferences into BITs. 
 
Several studies have highlighted that South-South BITs provided an occasion to 
safeguard greater policy space in investment agreements. At the same time these 
studies only found mixed evidence of developing countries seizing this opportunity. 
On the one hand, scholars and international organizations have concluded that South-
South treaties contain some systemic variations from North-South treaties. According 
to Lauge Poulsen, national treatment and transfer of funds clauses in South-South 
treaties grant more flexibility to host states than in North-South treaties.16 UNCTAD 
also found that some features, such as performance requirements and pre-
establishment clauses, tend to occur less frequently in South-South treaties.17 
 
On the other hand, these studies also concluded that variation between South-South 
and North-South treaties is overall minor. According to UNCTAD “[t]o a large part, 
South-South IIAs are similar to North-South IIAs.”18 Coming to the same conclusion 
as UNCTAD, Malik thus surmises that “Southern countries have not taken advantage 
of the more ‘equal’ negotiating space, free of traditional political pressures associated 
with North-South, post-colonial relationships, to design more bespoke provisions in 
their treaties.”19 
 
Two sets of reasons have been offered in the literature why South-South BITs do not 
depart more radically from North-South templates. First, Malik points out that the 
asymmetric bargaining dynamics present in the latter often also occur in the former as 
a powerful developing country negotiates with a less developed counterpart.20 
Second, lack of expert knowledge and bounded rationality may have clouded the need 
to take advantage of the more favourable bargaining setting. As one negotiator 
interviewed by Poulsen revealed, “[o]ur negotiations with developing countries were 
generally much quicker and much easier. When demands were made we didn’t object, 
as most understood that these treaties were basically just signals, rather than hard and 
serious legal agreements.”21 By considering BITs as pieces of paper rather than 
enforceable legal instruments, Poulsen concludes that many developing states failed 
to see the necessity of adding safeguards to their treaties even where it may have been 
possible given the negotiation dynamics.22 																																																								16 Lauge Poulsen, ‘The Politics of South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties’ in T Broude, ML Busch 
and A Porges (eds), The Politics of International Economic Law (Cambridge Univ Pr 2011). 17 UNCTAD, South-South Cooperation in International Investment Arrangements (United Nations 
2005) 31. 18 ibid 45. 19 Mahnaz Malik, ‘South-South Bilateral Investment Treaties: The same old story?’ (2010) IISD Paper 
3 (2010) <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_south_bits.pdf>, accessed June 3, 2015. 20 ibid. 21 Poulsen, supra note 7, 199. 22 ibid, 200. 
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2.3. Towards testable hypotheses 
 
This general appraisal of development countries’ experience with investment treaties 
yields a number of hypotheses that can be empirically tested for the specific case of 
African BITs. First, are African countries rule-takers when it comes to North-South 
investment relations? Second, do some of them turn into rule-makers in South-South 
African treaties when bargaining powers are more equal and, if so, do they use their 
newly gained agency to integrate policy flexibilities into BITs? Finally, do we find 
rule-takers and rule-makers also in South-South African agreements and if so, what 
turns a country into one or the other? Is it power, expertise or something else?  
 
In the remainder of this paper, we will investigate these questions. We begin by 
introducing our methodology that uses consistency in treaty patterns as proxy for 
agency in negotiations and then applies it to African North-South and South-South 
treaties in the follow sections. 
 
3. Measuring agency in African BIT practice  
 
How can we measure whether a country is a rule-taker or a rule-maker in BIT 
negotiations? In this section we introduce the notion of inter-BIT consistency as a 
measure of agency in negotiations and outline how we can use consistency scores to 
determine what party shapes the outcome of BIT negotiations. 
 
3.1. Inter-treaty consistency as measure of agency 
 
Inter-treaty consistency is a desirable feature in a BIT network. From an inward 
investments perspective, coherent treaty language across BITs facilitates a country’s 
compliance with investment agreements, since it faces a homogenous set of 
international obligations rather than a patchwork of potentially conflicting 
commitments. From an investment outward perspective, a streamlined treaty 
landscape helps home country investors to vindicate their rights as they can rely on 
tried and tested treaty language and expertise acquired in dealing with other treaties. 
Therefore, countries strive to have coherent treaty networks. 
 
To facilitate consistency in a treaty network, states tend to employ “model BITs”.23 
These templates may either take the form of a written document that can form the 
basis of negotiations or may be distilled ad hoc from prior treaty practice. Some 
developed countries, like the United States, are often very successful in streamlining 
their investment practice by permitting only small deviations from their model 
templates.24 As we have shown elsewhere, the UK is the global champion when it 																																																								23 OECD, International Investment Perspectives (OECD: Paris, 2006), 144. “To secure a degree of 
consistency in their commitments the governments of many OECD countries have formulated Bilateral 
Investment Treaty ‘models’, which have been used as a template, or a starting point, for formulating 
new agreements.” 24 Asoka de Z. Gunawardana and José E Alvarez, ‘The Inception and Growth of Bilateral Investment 
Promotion and Protection Treaties’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) (JSTOR 1992) 533 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658683> accessed 31 January 
2016 For the U.S., former negotiator Alvarez remarked that the ‘truth is that to date the U.S. model 
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comes to consistency in treaty networks.25 Generally, from a developed country’s 
perspective, the only desirable deviation from prior practice is when a revision or 
innovation of that country’s model BIT has taken place. As can be neatly observed for 
cases like Canada or Japan, we then see different generations of internally coherent 
sets of treaties.26 
 
Consistency of a country’s BIT network is thus in essence a measure of its agency in 
negotiation. If a country is repeatedly successful in shaping the outcome of bilateral 
negotiations, it will have a more coherent treaty network than a country that always 
opts into the treaty template of its negotiation partners. By investigating consistency 
across treaties we can therefore gain insights into which country shapes negotiation 
outcomes.  
 
3.2. Approach 
 
To formally define African countries’ consistency in BITs, we rely on a metric we 
proposed in an earlier paper.27 For every treaty pair we identify the number of 
common unique 5-character-long substrings in the two texts. The main advantage of 
this metric is that it is aware of word order. We then divide this number by the total 
number of unique 5-character-long substrings in the pair. This measure is formally 
known as a Jaccard distance between sets of treaty 5-grams. It belongs to a range 0...1 
and shows textual similarity or dissimilarity between pairs of treaties, with 0 
indicating that 100% of 5-character-long substrings in the two specified BITs are the 
same, and 1 indicating that 0% of 5-character-long substrings in the two specified 
BITs are the same. 
 
The Jaccard distance itself is unit-less. That is why it has to be interpreted in a relative 
sense assessing how sets of treaties differ in their similarity scores from each other. 
We define the mean Jaccard distance between the BITs signed by a particular country 
as that country’s consistency score. We can use the ensuing numbers to compare 
consistency scores across states. Countries that sign relatively similar treaties will 
have a more favourable consistency score (i.e. a lower mean Jaccard distance) than 
countries with relatively diverse treaties (i.e. that display a higher mean Jaccard 
distance).  
 
Figure 1 displays the mean Jaccard distance of the national BIT networks of all 
African country. We see that some countries like South Africa or Morocco possess a 
more coherent treaty network than other African states, such as Mali, Egypt or 
Uganda. 
 
  
																																																																																																																																																														
BIT has been regarded as, generally-speaking, a “take it or leave it” proposition, with the United States 
calling the shots and the BIT partner as supplicant.”’ 25 Alschner and Skougarevskiy, supra note 3. 26 ibid. 27 ibid. 
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Figure 1: Consistency scores of National BIT networks in Africa 
 
 
 
Aside from calculating mean Jaccard distances of a country’s entire BIT network, we 
can also use Jaccard distances for other purposes. For instance, by comparing a 
country’s mean score of North-South BIT Jaccard distances to the mean distance of 
its South-South treaties, we can get an indication whether a country is more coherent 
in its treaty making with other developing countries than with developed countries. 
Furthermore, we can look at Jaccard distances between treaties of interest to see 
where negotiating parties might have copied from each other’s treaties. Jaccard 
distances are thus a quite versatile measure to trace BIT design patterns.    
 
3.3. Data set 
 
We gather 511 BIT full texts where one of the signatories is an African country, of 
which 333 are in English and 178 are in French.28 Our primary source of BIT full 
																																																								28 We thank the participants of Trade and Investment Law Clinic-2015 of the Centre for Trade and 
Economic Integration at the Graduate Institute, Geneva for cleaning the African treaty texts and 
metadata, and Rodrigo Polanco for providing texts of missing South African treaties. 
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texts is Kluwer Arbitration29 which features treaties supplied by the research staff at 
the Penn State Institute of Arbitration. We then complemented this data set with 
additional treaties exclusively available at Investment Claims30, UNCTAD or other 
sources. In total our full text data encompasses 57% of all treaties signed by African 
countries (891 BITs) according to the UNCTAD database and our manual data 
collection effort.31 When it comes exclusively to sub-Saharan Africa,32 we similarly 
have 57% of BITs with English or French full texts available (358 out of 631 treaties 
signed). 
 
Next, we edited the texts excluding annexes, side-letters, protocols and footnotes. We 
then corrected typos, optical character recognition errors and other mistakes in the 
underlying data sources. We also unified treaty spelling, converting all British English 
words into their American English counterparts (e.g. “favour” to “favor”) with the aid 
of spelling variant pairs from VarCon.33  For Jaccard distance computations we 
removed all punctuation, accents, and capitalization from the documents. 
 
4. Greater Agency in South-South African BITs? 
 
Applying the above methodology to African BITs, the first question we need to 
answer is whether there is a systematic difference between North-South and South-
South African BITs. Our hypothesis is that agency on the part of African countries 
will be higher in negotiations among themselves (South-South) than in negotiations 
with developed countries (North-South).34 
 
In order to empirically test this hypothesis we compare Jaccard distances between 
pairs of treaties. The intuition is that African countries will have to buy into diverging 
developed country model templates in North-South BITs resulting in a patchwork 
treaties with low overall consistency, while they can benefit from more symmetric 
bargaining power and more homogenous preferences in South-South negotiations to 
conclude more consistent treaties. Suppose there are three African countries: A1, A2 
and A3, and one country N outside Africa. Our agency hypothesis will be supported if 
Jaccard distance between the text of A1-A2 bilateral treaty and A2-A3 bilateral treaty 
will be lower than that between the texts of A1-N and A2-N treaties. Similarly, the 
hypothesis will hold if the Jaccard distance between A1-A3 BIT and A2-A3 BIT will 
be lower than that between A1-N and A3-N treaties.  
 
We extend this pair-wise comparison to Jaccard distances between 75,361 treaty pairs 
that are present in our data with the aid of a multivariate linear regression. Its results 																																																								29 http://kluwerarbitration.com 30 http://oxia.ouplaw.com 31 All African countries, apart from the Seychelles, that are signatories to BITs, are present in our 
treaty sample.  32 We define sub-Saharan African as any country on the African continent apart from Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. 33 http://wordlist.aspell.net/varcon/ 34 For the purposes of this paper we define the treaty as North-South if one of the signatories is an 
African country, and another one is not. Similarly, the treaty is South-South when both signatories are 
African countries. We are aware of the breadth of the definition “Global South” and that it may include 
non-African developing countries. However, in this paper we contrast African countries and the rest of 
the world. 
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are reported in the below table. For the purposes of this regression, we combine 
Jaccard distances between English-language treaty pairs and between French-
language treaty pairs (but not cross-language Jaccard distances) and account for 
language differences with the aid of a French language dummy variable. 
 
Table 1: Regression results for pair-wise Jaccard distances 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE: 
Jaccard 5-gram distance between texts of a pair of BITs where one 
of the signatories is an African country 
      
First treaty in the pair is 
betw. two African 
countries 
-0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) 
      
Second treaty in the pair is 
betw. two African 
countries 
-0.005 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.005 
(0.007) (0.016) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
      
Both treaties in the pair are 
betw. two African 
countries 
-0.058*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.101*** 
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.004) 
      
Treaty pairs 71,031 71,031 71,031 71,031 71,031 
R2 0.284 0.479 0.359 0.423 0.440 
Scope all Africa all Africa all Africa all Africa Sub-Saharan 
Signature year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
First treaty, first signatory 
FE 
no yes no yes yes 
First treaty, second 
signatory FE 
no no yes no no 
Second treaty, first 
signatory FE 
no yes no no yes 
Second treaty, second 
signatory FE 
no no yes yes no 
Note: Standard errors clustered at first treaty, first signatory level and second treaty, first signatory 
level in parentheses. French-language treaty BIT text dummy and year of treaty signature FE are 
included in the model but not reported. “Scope” indicates whether we define African country as the one 
that belongs to the continent or the one that is in the sub-Saharan group. Stars show significance: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The hypothesis that African countries enjoy greater agency in intra-African 
negotiations is strongly supported by the regression results. When both treaties in the 
pair are between African countries, the Jaccard distance between them is consistently 
lower by 0.06, indicating higher textual similarity. This finding is robust to yearly 
idiosyncratic changes in treaty practice and accounts for unobserved differences in 
treaty practice across first or second signatory in any of treaties in the pair. 
Furthermore, when both BITs in the pair are between sub-Saharan countries, the 
Jaccard distance between them is lower by 0.10, almost a two-fold increase. As we 
will show in Section 6, this surge in sub-Saharan textual similarity is explained by the 
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markedly inconsistent but large treaty network of Egypt, which is not a sub-Saharan 
economy. 
 
Hence, African states seem to seize the opportunities of more symmetrical 
negotiations among similarly situated African countries to exert greater agency over 
the outcome of BIT negotiation processes than they can in North-South negotiations. 
Two key questions ensue. First, do African countries use their greater agency in 
South-South BITs to infuse more policy space into BITs? Second, have some African 
countries more agency than others or, differently put, do we have rule-takers and rule-
makers also in Africa? 
 
 
5. More Policy Space in South-South African BITs? 	Do African countries use their greater agency in South-South BITs to carve out more 
policy space in their BITs? To answer this question we investigate the inclusion of 
exceptions in North-South versus South-South Agreements. While we find examples 
of policy space exceptions unique to South-South African agreements, they are 
relatively rare and only systematically pursued by a few countries. The main impetus 
for more policy space actually comes from more recent North-South Agreements. 
 
5.1. Policy space exceptions over time 	
We have coded our set of African treaties alongside the policy flexibility they 
provide. In Annex 2 we list 20 exception features commonly identified in scholarship 
and the works of international organizations that seek to counterbalance investment 
protection obligation and provide the host country with policy space. While they are 
not exhaustive in describing the ways a country may reserve policy space, they are 
valid proxies to assess how treaties safeguard non-investment concerns. Our 
expectation based on the above discussion is that South-South agreements contain 
more such public policy elements than North-South agreements to protect host 
country policy space. 
 
Our expectation that South-South African BITs contain more exceptions, however, is 
not confirmed. Comparing annual averages of the number of treaty exceptions for 
both types of agreements in Figure 2, we find that until 2000 North-South and South-
South BITs in Africa did not differ significantly – both types of agreements had low 
numbers of exceptions. Thereafter, in the early 2000s, exceptions briefly rose in 
South-South African BITs, but then stagnated until recently. In the meantime, the 
number of exception has surged in North-South BITs. What should we make of these 
trends? To explain the observed patterns we take a closer look at the policy 
exceptions clauses. 
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Figure 2: Average number of exceptions per treaty per year 
 
 
5.2. Policy space exceptions made in the South  
 
Importantly, we find evidence that the African states used their greater agency in 
South-South agreements to include public policy exceptions into their agreements that 
had no equivalent in developed countries’ model BITs. However, the practice is not 
widespread, concentrated in time to the decade between 1996-2006 and only 
systematically pursued by a few countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The most prevalent Southern flexibility provision is a “Prohibitions and Restrictions” 
clause.35 It originated in Article 11 of the China – Singapore BIT in 1985, but was 
subsequently widely adopted by developing countries, including in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Mauritius, probably the most sophisticated rule-maker in Africa (see further 
below), brought the clause to the continent in 1996 and made it standard practice. 
Article 11 of the China-Mauritius BIT (1996) reads: 
 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not in any way limit the right of either 
Contracting Party to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any 
other action which is directed to the protection or its essential security 
interests, or to the protection of public health or the prevention of diseases 
and pests in animals or plants or the protection of its environment. 
 
Since then at least 15 Mauritian BITs with other African countries spread the clause 
throughout the continent. Other sub-Saharan countries then incorporated it in their 
agreements, like the Madagascar-South Africa BIT (2006),36 the Eritrea-Uganda BIT 																																																								35 In French-language treaties, the clause appears as an “Interdictions et Restrictions” Clause or a 
“Droit de Prendre Des Mesures” provision. 36 Article 3.	
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(2001),37 the Burundi-Comoros BIT (2001)38 or the Botswana-Egypt BIT (2003).39 
Without an equivalent in developed country practice and well before the 2004 U.S. 
model BIT or the first wave of investment awards, states in sub-Saharan Africa were 
thus using their agency in symmetrical negotiations to safeguard policy space.  
 
Environmental measures are another area where sub-Saharan countries were avant-
gardes in rulemaking. In 2003 Botswana included Article 13 in its BIT with Egypt:  
 
(1) Recognising the right of each Contracting Party to establish its own 
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental 
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or nullify accordingly its 
environmental legislation, each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure that 
its legislation provides for high, levels of environmental protection and shall 
strive to continue to improve this legislation.  
2) The Contracting Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic environmental legislation. Accordingly, 
each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or 
otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such 
legislation as an encouragement for the establishment, maintenance or 
expansion of an investment in its territory.  
(3) The Contracting Parties reaffirm their commitments under the 
international environmental agreements which they have accepted. They 
shall strive to ensure that such commitments are fully recognised and 
implemented in accordance with their domestic legislation.  
(4) The Contracting Parties recognise that co-operation between them 
provides enhanced opportunities to improve environmental protection 
standards. Upon request by either Contracting Party, the other Contracting 
Party shall accept to hold expert consultations on any matter falling under 
the purview of this Article. 
  
A similar provision was later included into the Botswana-Mauritius BIT (2005) 
Article 12. Importantly, Botswana’s practice predates that of Belgium, which started 
to include equivalent clauses in 2004.40 
 
5.3. From makers to takers of policy space exceptions 
 
Oddly, at the time when the discourse around the need for policy space in 
international investment agreements began to intensify, autochthone exceptions began 
to disappear in South-South BITs of sub-Saharan Africa. Today, the majority of 
policy exceptions in African BITs is either “imported” via North-South agreements or 
copied from there. Moreover, Africa is lagging behind in integrating the drive towards 
more policy space into South-South agreements that is well underway in North-South 
agreements.  
 																																																								37 Article 14. 38 Article 12. 39 Article 12. 40 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (ed), International Investment Law: 
Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations (OECD 2008) 143. 
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Several Northern countries consistently integrate public policy exceptions into their 
recent treaties. Canada, the U.S., Turkey and Japan enshrine a wide range of public 
policy safeguards in their agreements. As Table 2 shows, these BITs not only contain 
more flexibility clauses than their South-South counterparts, but they also post-date 
them by a decade. Those South-South BITs that are also of a more recent vintage like 
the Mauritius-Egypt BIT of 2014 have supplemented the old exceptions of the 1990s 
and early 2000s with new language limiting the scope of fair and equitable treatment 
and most-favoured nation taken from American, Canadian or Japanese treaties.  
 
Table 2: Top ranking treaties by number of exceptions 
 
North-South 
African Treaties 
# of Exceptions South-South 
African Treaties 
# of Exceptions 
CAN-TZA (2013) 17 MUS-EGY (2014) 7 
CAN-CMR (2014) 15 BWA-EGY (2003) 5 
CAN-BFA (2015) 15 MUS-BWA (2005) 5 
CAN-MLI (2014) 14 UGA-ERI (2001) 5 
USA-RWA (2008) 13 MUS-MDG (2004) 4 
CAN-BEN (2013) 13 ZAF-MDG (2006) 4 
CAN-CIV (2014) 13 GAB-MAR (2004) 3 
CAN-NGA (2014) 13 GNQ-ZAF (2004) 3 
CAN-SEN (2014) 13 MUS-MOZ (1997) 3 
JPN-MOZ (2013) 11 MUS-SWZ (2000) 3 
TUR-TZA (2011) 10 MUS-ZWE (2000) 3 
AUT-NGA (2013) 9 MUS-RWA (2001) 3 
CAN-ZAF (1995) 9 MUS-EGY (2003) 3 
CAN-EGY (1996) 9 CMR-MRT (2001) 2 
TUR-GAB (2012) 9 COM-BFA (2001) 2 
 
We thus observe an interesting reversal. While some parts of sub-Saharan Africa were 
ahead of the curve at the dawn of the new millennia commonly including general 
regulatory or environmental concerns into BITs, these countries have become 
bystanders as innovation is made elsewhere and then imported into the continent via 
North-South Agreements or copy-and-pasting. 
 
6. Rule-takers and rule-makers in African South-South BITs   
  
Shifting the focus from the continent to individual countries, we finally investigate 
whether there are countries that make use of their agency in South-South BITs more 
than others. Differently put, we ask who are the rule-makers and rule-takers in Africa? 
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Countries in Africa are very diverse in their level of development and investment 
policy expertise. On one end of the spectrum are states such as Egypt or South Africa 
that have considerable market power, are central political forces in their respective 
regions and have comparably more bureaucratic capacity. On the other end are the 
poor least developed countries of central Africa. One would thus suspect that some of 
the same power and capacity asymmetries that turn developed countries into rule-
makers in North-South agreements also shape the negotiation dynamics in South-
South treaties. In this section, we trace patterns in South-South BITs and test our two 
hypotheses that power and expert knowledge may drive consistency scores through 
case studies. 
 
6.1. Indecisive role of power asymmetries 
 
Surprisingly, power asymmetry seems to play only a subsidiary role in shaping the 
landscape of South-South BITs in Africa. Table 3 displays the consistency score of 
African countries based on the South-South African BITs they sign. We see that 
relatively small countries like Cameroon and Mauritius lead that list.   
 
Table 3: Top-ranking countries in South-South consistency score 
 
Rank Country South-South 
Consistency 
(Overall Consistency) 
# of South-South BITs 
(Total # of BITs) 
1. MAR 0.275 (0.503) 9 (44) 
2. CMR 0.280 (0.553) 6 (16) 
3. ZAF 0.294 (0.482) 15 (33) 
4. MRT 0.331 (0.565) 3 (7) 
5. MUS 0.342 (0.452) 19 (38) 
6. BEN 0.349 (0.559) 5 (13) 
7. COM 0.384 (0.459) 3 (4) 
8. GHA 0.384 (0.532) 6 (18) 
9. BFA 0.393 (0.514) 6 (11) 
10. TCD 0.449 (0.595) 5 (8) 
11. GIN 0.482 (0.556) 8 (11) 
12. EGY 0.538 (0.577) 14 (70) 
13. ETH 0.544 (0.561) 5 (25) 
14. DZA 0.544 (0.572) 9 (35) 
15. SEN 0.586 (0.639) 4 (17) 
 
Note: “South-South Consistency” is mean Jaccard 5-gram distance between pairs of treaties with other 
African countries signed by the specified African country (lower score indicates more consistency). 
“Overall Consistency” is mean Jaccard 5-gram distance between all pairs of treaties signed by the 
specified African country. “# of South-South BITs” is the number of treaties (with full texts available 
in French or English) signed by an African country where the second signatory is also an African 
country. “Total # of BITs” is the number of bilateral investment treaties signed by an African country 
(with full texts available in French or English). Per-country mean Jaccard distances are computed 
separately for English- and French-language treaties, averaged by language, and combined with the aid 
of a mean weighted by the number of treaties per language. All consistency scores are computed only 
for countries with more than 2 treaties in respective group. Extended version of this table is available in 
Appendix. 
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Particularly unexpected is the low rank occupied by Egypt. The country has signed 
112 investment agreements, yet it fails to impose its terms on its BIT negotiation 
partners. Figure 3 displays Egypt’s treaty network revealing a patchwork of 
differently worded agreements. Take the 2003 BIT Egypt signed with Mauritius. In 
2003, Egypt’s GDP exceeded that of Mauritius 15-fold and with a population of more 
than 70 million its market was 60 times bigger than that of Mauritius. Yet, Mauritius 
and not Egypt dictated the terms of the treaty: the treaty displays a 93% similarity to 
the Mauritius-Rwanda BIT (2001), and a 91% to Mauritius-Zimbabwe BIT (2000), 
Mauritius-Mozambique BIT (1997), and Mauritius-Swaziland BIT (2000). In 
contrast, it only displays a similarity of 54% (Armenia-Egypt BIT (1996)) or lower to 
all earlier Egyptian BITs. The only Egyptian treaty coming close in similarity to its 
BIT with Mauritius is the Botswana-Egypt BIT with 75% of similarity – signed on the 
very same day as the Mauritius BIT. 
 
Figure 3: Egypt’s English-language BIT network 
 
Note: this figure shows a heat map of pair-wise similarities of all English-language bilateral investment 
treaties where Egypt was a signatory. Similarities are defined as Jaccard distances between treaty 5-
grams and vary from 0 to 1 where zero means full overlap of 5-grams and 1 implies no overlap of 5-
grams in two given texts. We color zeros as red and ones as yellow and employ gradient to show values 
in between. The actual similarity scores are reported in cells. Treaties are ordered by date of signature. 
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Power asymmetry seems to have played a more decisive role with respect to South 
Africa. In 1994, the country signed its first BIT with Great Britain and then, as Lauge 
Poulsen revealed in interviews with South African negotiators, decided to base its 
own BIT program on the UK model.41 The ensuing treaty network is divided into two 
parts as can be seen in Figure 4. First, in negotiations with wealthier developed 
countries between 1995 and 1998, South Africa was not successful in shaping the 
outcome of negotiations resulting in an internally incoherent treaty network. In 
contrast, starting in 1998, South Africa began negotiating with other African countries 
and could bring to bear its superior bargaining power. The resulting BITs closely 
mirror the country’s first BIT with the UK and are more consistent among 
themselves. 
 
Figure 4: South Africa’s English-language BIT network 
 
 
Note: this figure shows a heat map of pair-wise similarities of all English-language BITs where South 
Africa was a signatory. Similarities are defined as Jaccard distances between treaty 5-grams and vary 
from 0 to 1 where zero means full overlap of 5-grams and 1 implies no overlap of 5-grams in two given 
texts. We color zeros as red and ones as yellow and employ gradient to show values in between. The 
actual similarity scores are reported in cells. Treaties are ordered by date of signature. 																																																								41 Poulsen, supra note 7, 199. 
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How can we explain this difference in approach? While South Africa capitalized on 
its bargaining power in South-South African BITs, Egypt failed to take advantage of 
it. We suggest that expert knowledge played a decisive role in shaping the design of 
South-South BITs. 
 
6.2. Expert knowledge decisive for treaty outcomes 
 
As Lauge Poulsen’s research suggests, many developing countries thought that BITs 
were simple ink on paper without any meaningful effect on the real world.42 They 
only started to take BITs seriously when they were hit themselves by an investment 
claims.43 Yet, also among developing countries, the degree of expert knowledge 
differed. 
 
Expert knowledge about BITs may be informed by different sources. On the one 
hand, it can be the result of the adoption of an extraneous treaty template without 
necessarily considering whether this particular template is well suited for the adopting 
country. This seems to have been the case for South Africa. The country opted into 
the UK model and developed expertise in negotiating treaties based on it without fully 
reflecting on its implications. South African negotiators interviewed by Poulsen 
confessed that they considered BITs as “pure signals” or “a symbolic gesture” rather 
than “real and serious legal instruments with teeth”.44 This may explain the awkward 
design features that some of its treaties have taken: While broadly following the UK 
model, the South Africa-Senegal BIT (1998) is written in “Frenglish” promoting 
“investissement” in Article 2 or providing in Article 8 that disputes between the 
contracting parties have to be resolved “through negociation [sic] between the 
Governements [sic]”. In South Africa, policy makers only began to take BITs more 
seriously when a foreign investor challenged the country’s post-Apartheid legislation 
before international arbitration.45 Since then, South Africa has halted its BIT program, 
began an in-depth review of the costs and benefits of BITs and started to terminate 
some of its existing treaties.46  
 
On the other hand, expert knowledge can grow endogenously driven by a strategic, 
well-conceived, long-term international investment policy. In contrast to the South 
Africa case, such policy-led expert knowledge can then enable a country to dominate 
negotiations even in bargaining situations with more powerful countries. The most 
impressive example of a country employing expert knowledge and long term strategy 
to build a coherent treaty network is Mauritius. In the last decades, the country 
steadily shifted from a manufacturing-based economy to a hub for financial 																																																								42 Poulsen, supra note 7. 43 Lauge Poulsen and Emma Aisbett, ‘When the Claim Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Bounded Rational Learning’ (2013) 65 World Politics 273. 44 Lauge Poulsen, Sacrificing Sovereignty by Chance: Investment Treaties, Developing Countries, and 
Bounded Rationality (Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science 2011) 280. 45	Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/01. 46 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Trends in International Investment Agreements: Calls for Reforms of Model 
Bilateral Investment Treaties in Norway, South Africa and the United States’, Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy 2009-10 (2010). 
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services.47 The Mauritian government fostered this transition through the creation of 
an enabling legal framework that included the conclusion of international investment 
agreements and double taxation treaties.48 Aside from seeking to attract investment 
inflows into the countries’ tourism industry, Mauritius signed these treaties to make it 
an attractive destination for companies that want to invest in Africa and South Asia. 
Known as the “Mauritius Route”, this strategy has been tremendously successful: in 
India alone, 40% of the country’s foreign direct investment inflows have been 
channelled through Mauritius between 2000 and 2011.49  Not surprisingly then, 
Mauritian companies have become active users of investor-state arbitration having 
filed three cases against India and one against Pakistan and Madagascar 
respectively.50 
 
This coherent strategy of creating an enabling environment for FDI inflows and 
outflows is reflected in Mauritius’ BIT network depicted in Figure 5. While Mauritius 
has to give way to the preferences of powerful developed states, it punches above its 
weight when it comes to South-South agreements succeeding in having its own treaty 
preferences shape the outcome of negotiations.  
 
  
																																																								47 UNCTAD, ‘Investment Policy Review Mauritius’ (2001) 1; OECD, ‘Investment Policy Reviews: 
Mauritius’ (2014) 19.  48 ibid. 49 Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, ‘Factsheet on FDI Inflow to India’, December 2011, 
Annex 1, <http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/2011/india_FDI_December2011.pdf>, 
accessed January 28, 2016. 50 Bechtel Enterprises Holdings, Inc. and GE Structured Finance (GESF) v. The Government of India; 
CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited and Telcom Devas Mauritius 
Limited v. Republic of India (PCA Case No. 2013-09); Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Limited v. India; 
Progas Energy Ltd v. Pakistan; Courts (Indian Ocean) Limited and Courts Madagascar S.A.R.L. v. 
Republic of Madagascar (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/34). These cases have been identified from the 
UNCTAD ISDS database, January 2016.  
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Figure 5: Mauritius’ English-language BIT network 
 
 
Note: this figure shows a heat map of pair-wise similarities of all English-language bilateral investment 
treaties where Mauritius was a signatory. Similarities are defined as Jaccard distances between treaty 5-
grams and vary from 0 to 1 where zero means full overlap of 5-grams and 1 implies no overlap of 5-
grams in two given texts. We color zeros with red and ones with yellow and employ gradient to show 
values in between. The actual similarity scores are reported in cells. Treaties are ordered by date of 
signature. 
 
A country even better than Mauritius in terms of its intra-African consistency score is 
Morocco. Like Mauritius, Morocco is a rule-taker in negotiations with developed 
countries. Figure 6 shows how the BITs signed with France (1996) and Portugal 
(2007) break the otherwise neatly consistent pattern that characterizes Morocco’s role 
as rule-maker in intra-African negotiations since 1991. 
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Figure 6: Morocco’s French-language BIT network 
 
 
Note: this figure shows a heat map of pair-wise similarities of all English-language bilateral investment 
treaties where Morocco was a signatory. Similarities are defined as Jaccard distances between treaty 5-
grams and vary from 0 to 1 where zero means full overlap of 5-grams and 1 implies no overlap of 5-
grams in two given texts. We color zeros with red and ones with yellow and employ gradient to show 
values in between. The actual similarity scores are reported in cells. Treaties are ordered by date of 
signature. 
 
What explains the success of Moroccan negotiators is difficult to ascertain. In 
comparison with its negotiating partners, Morocco does not stand out in terms of its 
economic power or foreign policy influence. We therefore suspect that, not unlike 
Mauritius, Morocco may have succeeded in shaping BIT outcomes through policy-led 
technical expertise. Further research is needed to corroborate this claim. 
 
6.3. Spurs of the moment 
 
Finally, some treaty design patterns can neither be attributed to power asymmetries 
nor to expertise-driven long-term policymaking, but are literally spurs of the moment.  
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Another country that fares extremely well in terms of intra-African consistency scores 
is Cameroon with an average similarity of 72% across its South-South African 
treaties. This, however, is not due to the outstanding power or expertise of 
Cameroon’s negotiators, but rather due to the fact that 3 of its 6 intra-African BITs 
were signed on a single day – 18 May 2001 – in the course of the Third UN 
Conference on the Least Developed Countries.51  Hence, aside from power and 
expertise, there is also a more erratic element that has shaped international investment 
policy in Africa.52 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Who are the rule-takers and rule-makers in the African BIT universe? This paper 
provided a differentiated answer to that question. First, we confirmed the hypothesis 
that African states are rule-takers in North-South negotiations, while they tend to act 
more often as rule-makers in South-South BITs. At the same time, the greater agency 
countries have in South-South BITs is generally not used to safeguard non-investment 
protection values in BITs. 
 
Second, we found that while also Africa has its own rule-makers and rule-takers, 
negotiation outcomes seem to be shaped more by expert knowledge rather than power 
asymmetries. Egypt, for instance, is revealed as rule-taker in our analysis in spite of 
its large market and active foreign policy. In contrast, smaller countries such as 
Mauritius or Morocco, presumably due to better in-house expertise and a more 
coherent investment policy agenda, are more successful in setting the terms of 
investment agreements. What this suggests is that more technical expertise can not 
only help turn some of Africa’s rule-takers into rule-makers, but may also enable 
countries to pursue their investment policy consistently with a view to achieving more 
coherent treaty networks.  
 
Our paper thus provides a more nuanced view of the African treaty landscape and 
points to new areas of research to determine what turns countries into rule-makers as 
opposed to rule-takers.  
 
 
  
																																																								51 UNCTAD, ‘29 bilateral investment treaties signed by least developed countries in Brussels’ (17 
May 2001) LDCIII/PRESS/08/Rev.1, 
<http://unctad.org/en/pages/PressReleaseArchive.aspx?ReferenceDocId=2914>, accessed on January 
30, 2016. 52 For an in-depth investigation of the bounded rational diffusion of BITs including in Africa see 
Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen, Bounded Rationality and Economic Diplomacy: The Politics of 
Investment Treaties in Developing Countries (1 edition, Cambridge University Press 2015).	
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Annex 1: Consistency Scores 
 
Country 
# Total 
BITs 
# S-S 
BITs 
# N-S 
BITs 
Overall 
Consistency 
S-S 
Consistency 
N-S 
Consistency 
BDI 5 2 3 0.403 NA NA 
MUS 38 19 19 0.452 0.342 0.505 
COM 4 3 1 0.459 0.384 NA 
SWZ 4 1 3 0.472 NA 0.481 
BWA 5 2 3 0.474 NA NA 
ZAF 33 15 18 0.482 0.294 0.537 
MAR 44 9 35 0.503 0.275 0.540 
BFA 11 6 5 0.514 0.393 0.654 
ZWE 16 2 14 0.529 NA 0.537 
GHA 18 6 12 0.532 0.384 0.540 
TZA 14 2 12 0.550 NA 0.563 
CMR 16 6 10 0.553 0.28 0.659 
GIN 11 8 3 0.556 0.482 0.699 
BEN 13 5 8 0.559 0.349 0.636 
NAM 7 0 7 0.559 NA 0.559 
ETH 25 5 20 0.561 0.544 0.567 
MOZ 13 1 12 0.562 NA 0.568 
MRT 7 3 4 0.565 0.331 0.671 
NGA 15 2 13 0.569 NA 0.571 
ERI 3 1 2 0.570 NA NA 
DZA 35 9 26 0.572 0.544 0.578 
GMB 8 2 6 0.577 NA 0.605 
EGY 70 14 56 0.577 0.538 0.574 
UGA 11 2 9 0.577 NA 0.582 
MLI 6 2 4 0.592 NA NA 
TCD 8 5 3 0.595 0.449 0.727 
TUN 26 3 23 0.596 NA 0.607 
ZMB 7 1 6 0.597 NA 0.601 
MDG 7 2 5 0.598 NA 0.631 
GAB 7 1 6 0.615 NA 0.637 
RWA 4 2 2 0.616 NA NA 
CIV 7 0 7 0.620 NA 0.620 
LBY 14 4 10 0.623 NA 0.639 
KEN 7 0 7 0.624 NA 0.624 
COG 9 2 7 0.625 NA 0.626 
SDN 12 2 10 0.627 NA 0.632 
SEN 17 4 13 0.639 0.586 0.653 
CAF 3 2 1 0.667 NA NA 
COD 8 1 7 0.690 NA 0.684 
AGO 2 1 1 NA NA NA 
CPV 3 0 3 NA NA NA 
DJI 2 0 2 NA NA NA 
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GNB 0 0 0 NA NA NA 
GNQ 3 2 1 NA NA NA 
LBR 3 0 3 NA NA NA 
LSO 2 0 2 NA NA NA 
MWI 1 0 1 NA NA NA 
MYT 0 0 0 NA NA NA 
NER 2 1 1 NA NA NA 
REU 0 0 0 NA NA NA 
 
Note: “# Total BITs” is the number of bilateral investment treaties signed by an African country with 
full texts available in French or English. “# S-S BITs” is the number of treaties signed by an African 
country where the second signatory is also an African country. “# N-S BITs” is the number of treaties 
signed by an African country where the second signatory is not an African country. “Overall 
Consistency” is mean Jaccard 5-gram distance between all pairs of treaties signed by the specified 
African country (lower score indicates more consistency). “S-S Consistency” is mean Jaccard 5-gram 
distance between pairs of treaties with other African countries signed by the specified African country. 
“N-S Consistency” is mean Jaccard 5-gram distance between pairs of treaties with countries outside 
Africa signed by the specified African country. Per-country mean Jaccard distances are computed 
separately for English- and French-language treaties, averaged by language, and combined with the aid 
of a mean weighted by the number of treaties per language. All consistency scores are computed only 
for countries with more than 2 treaties in respective group. Otherwise, “NA” score is reported. Table is 
sorted by overall consistency score. 
 
 
Annex 2: Coded Features 
 
Exception Features 
Balance of Payments 
Bona Fide Taking Carve-out 
Compulsory License Carve-out 
Creditor Protection 
Culture 
Denial of Benefits 
Environmental Measures Clause 
Exchange Rate Measures Carve-out 
FET linked to CIL 
GATT XX 
Health Exception 
Indirect Expropriation 
Indirect FET Breach Carve-out 
International Security Exception  
Investment Characteristics 
Non-conforming Measures 
Prudential Measures Carve-out 
REIO 
Security Exception  
Lowering standards 
 
